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Abstract 
In this paper I try to show that semantics can explain word-to-world relations and that 
sentences can have meanings that determine truth-conditions. Critics like Chomsky 
typically maintain that only speakers denote, i.e., only speakers, by using words in one 
way or another, represent entities or events in the world. However, according to their 
view, individual acts of denotations are not explained just by virtue of speakers' 
semantic knowledge (since, according to them, semantic knowledge is very scarce: see 
Pietroski, 2018). Against this view, I will hold that, in the typical cases considered, 
semantic knowledge can account for the denotational uses of words of individual 
speakers. 
 
Introduction 
The idea that the meaning of a sentence of a natural language determines its truth-
conditions has a long history. Minimally, the idea comes to the view that, given that a 
sentence is a representation that has a predicative structure, its representational content 
determines the conditions under which the representation is true. In general, the content 
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of a representation, or what the representation is about, determines its accuracy 
conditions. For instance, the content of a perceptual representation determines the 
conditions under which tokening that representation would make the tokening accurate. 
If the perceptual representation is about a black flying object, then the tokening of the 
representation is accurate only if it is tokened when there is a black flying object in the 
environment. All representations have accuracy conditions determined by what they are 
about. The accuracy conditions of representations that have a predicative structure are 
truth-conditions: the representation is accurate if it is true1. Thus, if a sentence of a 
natural language is representational, its content has to determine its truth conditions.  
The tradition of thinking that the meaning of a sentence can be expressed in terms of the 
truth conditions that its content determines is under heavy attack these days. The more 
we know about language, the more clearly we see that it is impossible to pair sentences 
with truth conditions one to one, even if we remove from our vocabulary all those 
expressions that require some contextual parameter to get a denotation (from 
demonstratives to gradable adjectives). This is because the rest of the lexical items also 
fail to have a definite denotation or content. No single word-type, it seems, has a 
representational content in the minimal sense that was introduced above, such that it 
seems impossible to provide the accuracy or appropriateness conditions of the use of a 
certain word. Examples abound, but probably the most striking ones concern proper and 
natural kind terms. As Chomsky (2000, 2016) has long argued, a proper name such as 
London can be used to refer to a place, to a set of people, to a political institution, to an 
economic centre, and even to a way of life, while the natural kind term water refers to 
                                                          
1 I do not mean to say that only sentences have predicative structure. The claim is that if a representation 
has a predicative structure, then its accuracy conditions are truth-conditions. 
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H2O only in the scientific “language game”, so to speak2. Otherwise, we do not call 
water a cup of tea, even if it may have a higher percentage of H2O molecules than the 
liquid that comes from a well (see Malt, 1994, Pietroski, 2018) The accuracy conditions 
of uses of London or water, thus, are not univocal or even consistent. 
In the case of perception, it has proven to be notoriously difficult to specify what a 
certain perceptual representation represents. There is a long debate concerning what 
kind of entity a frog may be representing when she snaps her tongue at a fly. However, 
we can say that a certain perceptual representation produced by the frog’s visual system 
represents, or is about, some particular content –we only do not know what that content 
is, and thus, we are not in a position to state its accuracy conditions-. A word-type, in 
contrast, seems to lack a particular denotation. That is, the issue is not that we do not 
know what content a word has; the issue is that a word does not have a content, i.e. an 
entity or event that it is about. As Chomsky and Pietroski insist, word-types fail to have 
denotations. A denotation, so the reasoning goes, is some entity in the world (or in the 
world as we believe it to be), and there is nothing in the world that is a place, a political 
institution, a way of life, etc., all at the same time3. Also, there is nothing in the world 
that covers all the uses we make of the term water, uses which are not based on how 
much H2O a certain liquid has.  
                                                          
2 Here I will be concerned with cases similar to the London and the water case. For other examples and 
responses, see Kennedy and Stanley (2009), Forbes (2012), and Segal (2012). 
3 See Chomsky (2000; 37): “London is not a fiction, but considering it as London – that is, through the 
perspective of a city name, a particular type of linguistic expression – we accord it curious properties: as  
noted earlier, we allow that under some circumstances, it could be completely destroyed and rebuilt 
somewhere else, years or even millennia later, still being London, that same city. […].We can regard 
London with or without regard to its population: from one point of view, it is the same city if its people 
desert it; from another, we can say that London came to have a harsher feel to it through the Thatcher 
years, a comment on how people act and live. Referring to London, we can be talking about a location or 
area, people who sometimes live there, the air above it (but not too high), buildings, institutions, etc., in 
various combinations (as in London is so unhappy, ugly, and polluted that it should be destroyed and 
rebuilt 100 miles away, still being the same city). Such terms as London are used to talk about the actual 
world, but there neither are nor are believed to be things-in-the world with the properties of the intricate 
modes of reference that a city name encapsulates”. 
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Travis’ famous cases point at the same phenomenon (Travis, 1996, 2008): in There is 
milk in the fridge, milk may stand for some portion of drinkable milk, or for some 
portion of milk that has been spilled inside the fridge. In The leaves are green, the 
leaves we speak about can be the leaves as they are intrinsically, or the leaves as they 
look, after having been painted (see Vicente, 2015), etc. So, declarative sentences do not 
have a particular truth conditional content, because their constituents do not have a 
denotational semantics, i.e. their constituents are not representations in the sense 
explained above: they are not about particular entities or events in the world. From here 
critics conclude that semantics is not in the business of explaining word-to-world 
relations (Chomsky, 2000, Pietroski, 2005, 2018, Yalcin, 2014, Collins, 2017).  
This latter is the thesis I will scrutinize in this paper. I will try to argue that the 
arguments that critics present do not show that semantics cannot explain word-to-world 
relations because sentences do not have meanings that determine truth-conditions4,5. 
Critics typically maintain that only speakers denote, i.e., only speakers, by using words 
in one way or another, represent entities or events in the world. However, according to 
their view, individual acts of denotations are not explained just by virtue of speakers’ 
semantic knowledge (since, according to them, semantic knowledge is very scarce: see 
Pietroski, 2018). Against this view, I will hold that, at least in the cases critics seem to 
find more problematic, semantic knowledge can account for the denotational uses of 
                                                          
4 That sentences have meanings that determine truth-conditions does not imply that sentences have 
univocal truth-conditions. It can be that sentences have several meanings, and that each of these meanings 
determines a set of truth-conditions. That is, in the view, as it is stated, sentential meanings cannot be 
captured in a simple T-schema.  
5 Also, I have to note that I will be less concerned with sentences and truth-conditions than with (certain) 
words and denotations. That words have denotations is a pre-requisite that has to be satisfied so that 
sentences can have truth-conditions. But then it has to be explained how composition rules work: this is 
the part that I will be less concerned with in this paper. Also, the paper will be focused on nominals and 
what nominals denote because the arguments based on variability and co-predication affect nouns (proper 
or common). As I will argue, this is also the case with respect to Travis cases. The thesis that I defend 
may not be valid for other classes of words (though see below). But the dialectics of the paper is: if the 
biggest problem that truth-conditional semantics has to face is the one that the critics signal, truth-
conditional semantics is not in such big trouble.  
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words of individual speakers. I will summarize my position at the end of this 
introductory section. Before that, I briefly review different ways in which one can react 
to this kind of attack on truth-conditional semantics.   
There are different ways to react to this attack on truth-conditional semantics. One is to 
single out a particular denotation among the different denotations that a word can have 
and explain the rest of possible denotations in terms of semantic or pragmatic 
mechanisms. For instance, it can be held that the literal meaning (i.e., the “real” 
denotation) of London is a certain spatial location, the rest of the possible denotations 
being generated by means of metonymical operations on that literal meaning. If the 
explanation provided for these denotation shifts is pragmatic, the result would be that 
although word-types have denotations and sentences contents that determine truth-
conditions, the truth-conditions of particular utterances of those sentences will typically 
not coincide with the truth-conditions of the sentence-type. This gives rise to the debate 
between minimalists and contextualists over what type of content theoreticians should 
attempt to explain: literal truth-conditions, which are usually not entertained in 
linguistic processing, or “intuitive” truth-conditions, which incorporate already shifted 
denotations (Recanati, 2010). This kind of “go pragmatic” reaction to arguments from 
variability is now loosing traction. On the one hand, as some authors have noted (e.g., 
Asher, 2011, Del Pinal, 2018), it is certainly difficult to specify the when and why of 
the pragmatic mechanisms that are said to operate on literal meanings. An account such 
as Recanati’s, which allows for free modulation of literal meanings according to 
contextual information, seems to lack the resources to explain why John finished the 
apple can easily be read as “John finished eating the apple” while John stopped the 
apple will never be read in such a way (Asher, 2011). Similarly, it is easy to understand 
Mary began the book as meaning that Mary began reading the book, but an utterance of 
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Mary began the elevator will not be understood as meaning that Mary began going up 
in the elevator. On the other hand, the idea that lexical items have literal meanings that 
are simple and stable denotations is an idealization that has at least two problems. The 
first problem is that the idealization is insensitive to a lot of systematic ways in which 
words combine (see below on Travis cases) and to the richness of such combinations: 
for instance, a privative adjective such as fake does not simply affect the denotation of 
the noun it modifies, but it also affects in a systematic way several other dimensions of 
its meaning (function, origin, sortal: Del Pinal, 2015). The second problem is that the 
idealization is simply untenable on the face of how entrenched polysemy is and how 
senses of polysemous expressions are typically stored and processed. A literalist 
hypothesis would predict that a particular sense of each word is accessed easier in all 
conditions. However, by and large, this is not what is observed, especially in the case of 
polysemies that pass copredication tests (Frisson, 2015, Schumacher, 2013, Ortega-
Andrés & Vicente, 2019).  
On the other hand, one can also think that truth-conditional semantics has the resources 
to explain meaning shifts and provide “intuitive” truth conditions without invoking 
pragmatic operations. A number of rules have been proposed to account for regular 
polysemies under names such as “meat grinder” or “universal grinder” (Copestake and 
Briscoe, 1995), and some authors make massive use of coercion to explain how a literal 
denotation can be coerced into a different meaning if the type of the literal denotation 
clashes with the selectional restrictions of the surrounding linguistic material (Asher, 
2015). This kind of reaction to the variability argument tries to show that the 
denotational semantic apparatus is not as meager as the skeptics, as well as the 
pragmaticians, think. The approach, however, shares some problems with the pragmatic 
approach, since there is evidence against any kind of general literalist approach. In 
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many cases (and especially in the cases of copredication), switching from one sense to 
another of a polysemous expression is smooth, there being no trace of an operation such 
as coercion (Frisson, 2015, Schumacher, 2013, Ortega-Andrés & Vicente, 2019). 
Another way of responding to the skeptics challenge is to hold that, contrary to what 
they claim, there are indeed entities in the world with the adequate profile to be 
denotations of word-types. Thus, London can be said to denote a complex entity formed 
by aspects or parts that specify a place, a political institution, a set of inhabitants, etc; 
school can be said to denote a complex entity formed by aspects that relate to a certain 
building, an institution, the people who run the institution, the kids that go to a certain 
building each day to attend classes, etc. According to this view, the ontology of the 
world includes complex entities formed by simpler entities: a statue is a complex 
formed by a piece of matter and some structure or organization; a human being is –
maybe- a mongrel formed by a body and a person, etc. Such complexes have distinct 
parts, each with its own persistence conditions; however, when they are together, they 
can be considered a single entity. Word-types denote these complex entities, but we can 
also use the words that denote these complexes to denote only parts of them. In a sense, 
the literal meaning of a word for, e.g., a city, is a complex entity. However, we can also 
single out a part or an aspect of that complex entity and refer only to that particular 
aspect, as when we say London is huge or London is unfriendly. The selection of these 
particular aspects is mediated by some semantic mechanism6: huge is a predicate that 
requires a “place” argument, whereas unfriendly requires an “animate entity” argument. 
It is relatively easy for us to believe that, say, John is a person and a body. When we say 
I met John, we say that we met the whole thing. But when we say John is fat we refer to 
his body, while when we say John is kind we refer to the person. Similarly, book 
                                                          
6 Although explaining how this semantic mechanism works is no easy task (see Asher, 2011, Gotham, 
2016).  
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denotes an informational content and a physical object. When we say I have a new book 
in the market, we refer to the whole complex; when we say the book is heavy but 
interesting the book we talk about is still the text and tome complex, which offers its 
two aspects for separate predication. But in the book is interesting we only denote the 
text aspect, and in the book is heavy we refer to the tome aspect.  
Pustejovsky (1995) introduced a new type in type theory, “dot types”, which refer to 
complex entities: dot objects. Dot objects are formed by two or more different objects 
that belong to different types, which are then called the ‘aspects’ of the dot object. The 
denotation of book is text•tome, the denotation of lunch is food•event of eating the food, 
etc. The idea that has been pointed at in the previous paragraph is to consider that our 
word-types may denote, or may be about, dot-objects, dot-objects being part of the 
world we talk about. Some formal ontologists (Arapinis, 2013) as well as formal 
semanticists (Gotham, 2016) have indeed pursued this line. I will criticize this view in 
the next section.  
However, it is also possible to think about these dot objects (and other similar posits) 
not as things in the world, but as descriptions or representations of conceptual structures 
in our minds. In this view, which is a yet third way to react to the attack of the skeptics, 
word-types do not denote entities in the world, but stand for conceptual structures that 
offer different possibilities of denotation. This is the line I am going to pursue here. The 
picture I will argue for is the following: the meaning of a word-type is a concept, a 
concept being a body of knowledge about a certain category stored in long-term 
memory. Concepts understood in this sense are structured mental entities that support 
different ways of categorizing the categories they are about and of supporting 
inferences. Categorization and inference can be based (at least) on theory-like or 
prototypical knowledge, as well as on stored exemplars or on idealizations (Machery, 
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2009, Weiskopf, 2009, Murphy, 2002, 2016, Rice, 2014, Vicente & Martínez-Manrique, 
2016). This variety of ways of categorizing explains why words can be used to denote 
only partially overlapping categories (say, water perhaps including tea but excluding 
water from a well vs. water including water from a well but excluding tea). However, 
concepts also provide a different kind of possibilities of denotation, related not to 
different ways of categorizing certain entities or substances, but to different pieces of 
information stored in the concept or knowledge structure. These are the cases of 
London, book, or school. In these cases, word tokens have denotations that do not 
overlap; rather, they refer to different kinds of entities in the world. But such 
denotations are represented by highly salient parts or aspects of a concept which, given 
the activation they receive, are easily targeted by the use of the word the concept is 
related to.  
I will try to explain how these two different kinds of possibilities of denotation 
(overlapping vs. not overlapping) can be accounted for. My focus, however, will be the 
non-overlapping cases, which I will examine by looking at the school example. I will 
provide a sketch of a conceptual structure that can be thought as the lexical meaning of 
school, which accounts for its different word-token denotations. This view should be 
able to provide a plausible account of how lexical meaning connects to (word-token) 
denotations. The most difficult issue to tackle in such a picture is co-predication, i.e. 
those cases where, apparently, we refer to the complex entities mentioned above. Co-
predication is a problem also for the authors that take a more Strawsonian view on 
denotation (i.e., language is not representational, but individuals do refer to worldly 
entities by using language). I will suggest that co-predicational sentences are 
compilations of complex semantic structures. It still has to be explained when these 
compilations are available: I will suggest that, typically, it is a matter of how certain 
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aspects of a concept enter into co-activation patterns. The general upshot of the 
approach, in any case, will be the following: whereas lexical meaning is not 
denotational in a simple, direct, way, it does determine a set of possible denotations. 
The critics are right about the claim that word-types do not have denotations, but not 
about the argument they mount on the basis of that claim. That word-types do not have 
denotations does not mean that lexical meanings do not contribute to determining truth-
conditions or that semantics is not in the business of explaining word-to-world relations.  
I will restrict my discussion to the case of nouns. It is possible that other classes of 
words (e.g., verbs) do not behave in the way that nouns behave. It is credible that verbs 
have the kind of scarce or thin meaning that Pietroski says all words have, encoding 
only general or schematic information of the kind that Levin and Rappaport Hovav have 
been pointing at for a long time (Levin & Rappaport Hovav, 2013; see also Allott & 
Textor, 2017). This possibility suggests that semantics can be more complicated than 
expected, such that the truth-conditions of a given sentence arise from an interaction 
between the rich meanings of nouns and the schematic meaning of verbs and other 
classes of words. For the most part, I will not enter into this issue here, though, as a 
reviewer reminds me, cases analogous to co-predication can also be found in the verbal 
domain: e.g., Elena writes movingly but illegibly. In any case, my claims will concern 
the semantic knowledge associated with nouns, which is, after all, where the critics have 
lately placed the battleground7.  
 
                                                          
7 What can be called a “rich meanings” or multidimensional account of verbs can be found in Zeevat et al. 
(2017), as applied to the polysemy of fall, and especially in Loebner’s (ms) cascade account of verbs 
meanings. According to Loebner, verb meanings can be explained in terms of levels of what I will here 
call “realization”. A case in point is the example above of writing, which can denote different actions that 
are in realization relations. Loebner makes use of frame semantics to flesh out his proposal. Frame 
semantics are also close in spirit to the proposals here presented, though I prefer not to commit to any 
particular account in linguistic semantics (not even to Pustejovsky’s, which I will take as a starting point 
later on). Thanks to a reviewer for directing me to Loebner’s work. 
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Dot objects and concepts as routes to denotations   
It is certainly weird to believe that there is an entity that is a place, a political entity, an 
economic centre, a way of living, and maybe a football team, all at the same time. It 
may make sense to believe that there is an entity that is a person and a body, or a text 
and a tome, but the denotational variability associated with a word is difficult to handle 
in terms of complex objects8. Think for instance about school: school can stand, at least, 
for:  
(1) a building: the school has been painted in red;  
(2) an educational process: she went to school;  
(3) a daily event: school starts at 9:00;  
(4) the rules of the institution that is associated with the building: the school has 
prohibited wearing hats in the classroom;  
(5) the people who run the local institution: I have talked to the school about it 
already;  
(6) the kids that attend a particular local institution: Today the school went for a 
visit to the Cathedral.  
There is a unity to all these different denotations, for all of them relate to a certain social 
artifact that is there for the purpose of educating people, but it is unclear that this unity 
can be captured in terms of a complex object that is a compound of the different 
denotations.  
The literature on dot objects discusses whether the alleged dot objects can be counted as 
such. Asher (2011), for instance, holds that we can only count informational books or 
                                                          
8 The book case is not so easy either: in yes, the book is beautiful but not credible we seem to denote two 
different senses associates to the “text” meaning: say, the writing and the plot. Thanks to my student 
Marina Ortega-Andrés for pointing this to me. 
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physical books, not pairs formed by physical objects (tomes) and contents (texts). From 
this he infers that dot objects, understood as complex entities, do not exist (if you cannot 
count them, they don’t exist). Gotham (2016), in contrast, claims that in There are three 
red interesting books we count physical objects paired with the contents they realize. 
Arapinis and Vieu (2015), on the other hand, try to establish conditions that the physical 
objects and the contents have to fulfill in order to be the objects of counting as complex 
entities.  I think that, pressing as this counting objection is, there is an even more 
pressing objection against the existence of the complex entities that allegedly figure as 
denotations of polysemous terms such as book or school. This objection against the 
“ontologization” of dot objects revolves around the idea that the persistence conditions 
of the wholes that inherently polysemous terms allegedly denote are unclear. If we say 
(Chomsky, 2000): London is so unhappy, ugly, and polluted that it should be destroyed 
and rebuilt 100 miles away, it seems that we are claiming that the alleged whole would 
survive even if only one of its parts (its reconstructed buildings and streets) would 
survive (nowhere is it said that inhabitants and councils are moved 100 miles away). 
However, it seems that the alleged whole should not exist when only one of its 
constitutive parts persist: if we say that a human being is constituted by body and mind, 
then the human being goes out of existence if either part does. In contrast, if, in the 
Chomskyan situation, all Londoners and the London institutions go on exile and decide 
not to move to the new location, we can also say that London is wherever the Londoners 
and the institutions are. So, if London could persist with the persistence of any of its 
parts, and parts can persist independently from each other, then we have too many 
Londons9. This, I take it, is a serious problem for defenders of the “complex entities” 
approach.  
                                                          
9 Riaño, a village in the North of Spain, was flooded after a dam was constructed. The Government built a 
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I will take a very different route: I will attempt at explaining facts about co-predication 
in terms of our conceptualization of the world, a point of view that can also explain the 
water and the Travis’s cases (although I will not say much about these cases here). This 
means, to begin with, that the proposal has more explanatory power than any other 
proposal that tackles each of these phenomena with different tools. As said above, a 
concept, according to the standard view in psychology, is a body of knowledge stored in 
long-term memory that is involved in higher level cognitive tasks, especially in 
categorization and inference. Concepts have some internal structure and are not isolated 
from each other. There are different accounts about how concepts are structured: in 
terms of exemplars and a similarity metric, in terms of prototypes that abstract statistical 
information from exemplars, in terms of theory-like or causal structures, or as hybrids 
of all these different structures –and maybe more, such as ideals (Murphy, 2002, 
Weiskopf, 2009, Machery, 2009, Rice, 2014, Bloch-Mullins, 2017)-. Here I will assume 
that a concept typically includes prototypical and theory-like information, maybe 
meshed together (Hampton et al. 2009, Rice, 2014, Bloch-Mullins, 2017), and can also 
recruit information from stored exemplars and idealizations (see Vicente & Martínez-
Manrique, 2016). 
The notion of concept that (some) psychologists use is said to be different from the 
notion used in philosophy (Machery, 2009). The following difference will be relevant to 
                                                                                                                                                                          
new village by the side of the lake that emerged, but many people refused to go to the new Riaño. 
Suppose that all the inhabitants of the old Riaño, including the major and the town council, refused to 
move to the new location. In that case, the following three assertions would have been true: 
   (1)Riaño is now in the middle of the lake. 
(2) Riaño is an ugly village. 
(3) Riaño refused to move to the new location and ended up settling down in a different place. 
Nobody would utter (1-3) in a row, but each of (1-3) says something that is true. One cannot react, to any 
utterance of (1-3), by saying: ‘well, strictly speaking, Riaño does not exist anymore’. My point, thus, is 
that, contrary to intuitive ontological principles, the defender of dot objects has to commit to the view that 
a particular dot object would persist even when its constitutive parts are pulled apart, with the 
consequence that the dot object entity is then able to persist in several different entities. 
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our concerns: whereas psychologists identify concepts as bodies of knowledge that have 
certain roles in higher order cognition, philosophers have it that concepts are 
constituents, or building blocks, of thoughts. The view that will be defended here is that 
concepts in the psychologist’s sense do not form part of thoughts; rather, the building 
blocks of thoughts will be parts or aspects of the concepts psychologists-sense.  
The hypothesis that I want to pursue is that nouns stand for concepts. In other words, 
the meaning of a noun is a concept. Concepts are representational entities: they are 
bodies of information about a certain category. However, concepts also offer different 
possibilities for denotation, depending on what kind of information the thinker focuses 
on and is therefore brought to working memory. To use an example borrowed from 
Machery and Seppälä (2010): there is a GRANDMOTHER concept, which is about 
grandmothers. This concept includes theory-like information about what grandmothers 
are -how they come into being-; but it also has prototypical information about 
grandmothers. Upon seeing an old lady, one can categorize her as a grandmother based 
on prototypical information only; accordingly, her thought “there is a car approaching a 
gentle grandmother” will have a prototypical representation of grandmothers as a 
constituent. The denotation of that representation in thought, and the denotation of the 
word-token grandmother used in giving voice to that thought, is not the set of actual 
grandmothers, but the set of old people that look like typical grandmothers. 
This kind of view can easily explain the water case: water can denote H2O, thus 
excluding the liquid from the well, when categorization is guided by the theory-like, 
essentialist, structure. But it can also stand for a liquid that looks enough like the stuff in 
rivers and lakes when categorization uses the prototype structure10. An adequate 
                                                          
10 It also explains cases like these, where the words in italics take a prototypical denotation:   
(1) Your friend is very German 
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explanation of Travis’ cases requires a paper on their own, but proposals such as 
Vicente’s (2012, 2015) and Del Pinal’s (2017) can serve as illustrations of how 
conceptual structures can account for the “green leaves” case. Del Pinal (2017), for 
instance, uses a slightly revised version of Pustejovsky’s qualia structures (Pustejovsky, 
1995) in order to explain the behavior of a number of adj+noun and noun+noun 
constructions. To put it very briefly: a qualia structure (Del Pinal’s version) is a 
conceptual structure associated with a noun that includes information about the kind, the 
origin, the constitution, the stereotypical appearance, and the function, of the entity the 
noun denotes. According to Del Pinal’s view, modifications can apply in principle to 
any of the qualia. Thus, green N can be three ways ambiguous: greenness can be 
predicated of the origin of the denotation of the nominal, of its associated stereotypical 
appearance, and of its constitutive structure. When green modifies ORIGIN we get the 
reading “naturally green”; when green modifies APPEARANCE the reading is “looks 
green”; and modification of CONSTITUTION in principle accounts for the variability 
observed in our judgments about how much of a certain object has to be green to be 
considered green. If an object has parts (that’s what CONSTITUTION refers to), then it 
may be enough that some parts of the object are green for it to be considered a green 
object (e.g. a green apple has to have a green skin, a green tree is not expected to have a 
green trunk, etc) . 
 
The school case 
                                                                                                                                                                          
(2) The platypus is more a mammal than a bird (Sassoon, 2017). 
Cases like (1) have been typically treated as cases of coercion, where the denotation of the predicate, 
which is not gradable, is turned into a gradable property: the prototype/stereotype associated to Germans. 
However, both in (1) and in (2), cases that Sassoon (2017) uses to assign a prototypical meaning to 
common names, can be seen as exhibiting that kind of polysemy that results from having different 
conceptual structures, or ways of categorizing, associated with a particular word. 
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In this section, I will present a somewhat simplified conceptual structure that represents 
the knowledge associated with the multiply polysemous word school. The structure 
attempts at capturing a relevant part of the knowledge that we have about schools, as 
well as how the different aspects of the informational structure relate to each other. We 
can begin by noting that a school is, categorically, an institution, and that its function is 
educating. Now, if that is the case, a typical school, being an institution, will need to 
have a physical realization (i.e., a physical object that hosts it and, in that sense, makes 
it real), and a certain social implementation or organization, including certain ways of 
being represented in society at large. Given the particular function that schools have, it 
is also expected (i) that schooling takes some time, which can be thought of as a 
process; (ii) that this process is in turn temporally organized, and (iii) that schools have 
students and teachers as participants or “inhabitants”. All these features, aspects or 
pieces of knowledge, are linked to, and to some extent depend on, our conceptualization 
of school as a social institution whose purpose is that students learn and socialize. A 
way of seeing how these pieces of information are all kept together or conform a 
coherent, robust, structure, is to think about all of them as specifying different realizers 
or implementers of an abstract entity (i.e. as things that the institution requires to be 
actualized). So, the knowledge structure is organized on the basis of our understanding 
of what a school is and how it is actualized in the world. A (Pustejovsky-inspired) way 
to represent the informational structure that captures the lexical meaning of school is the 
following: 
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There is a principled reason to include some information in the structure and leave some 
other information outside: the information that is included is all related to the realization 
(the making real or actual) of the institution. It captures what is typically required to 
have an institution with that function running. In order to have an institution for 
educating young people one needs some kind of organization, rules, staff, students, a 
location that is usually a building; also, one also needs to structure a schedule for 
teaching, organized in terms of hours, days, weeks, years, etc. Besides, any institution 
requires representatives that represent the institution in different social forums. The 
concept is structured and held together via explanatory relations: the fact that a school is 
the kind of institution that it is explains that there is a process, that the participants are 
teachers and young people, that there is some physical realization, typically a building, 
hosting the institution, etc. However, it is usually the case that entities and events can be 
realized in different ways. So there may be various ways in which the telos of the 
institution can be realized. While it is certainly typical to locate schools-institution in 
buildings, one can find schools-institutions in barracks, for instance. In such a case, the 
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word ‘school’ will apply to the barracks. So, the proposal is that a word that designates 
an institution (and, in general, any kind that requires realizers) will also denote its 
different realizers or implementers. The structure in (7) represents the realization 
structure of the school concept and assigns default values to each item in the structure11. 
For those familiar with the concepts literature, it represents some kind of integrated 
theory-prototype conceptual structure, since it captures explanatory relations and 
prototypical knowledge at the same time.  
This kind of account, besides explaining polysemy and co-predication (see below), is 
able to explain the linguistic facts that the Pustejovskyan qualia structures are supposed 
to explain, without resorting to the dubious dot objects or types. Pustejovsky (1995) 
introduced the qualia structures to account for the different ways in which predicates 
can modify nouns: a fast car is a car that drives fast, while a plastic car is a car made of 
plastic. In the first case, the modifier regards to the telos or function of the car, while in 
the second case it regards to its constitution (see above on Del Pinal’s treatment of 
Travis cases). In a parallel way, the different kinds of predicates that ‘school’ combines 
with are traceable to the knowledge structure in (7): the school (building) can be in 
ruins, it (process) can be expensive, it (rules) can be strict, etc. The structure in (7) 
implies a modification to the Pustejovskyan schema, where only four qualia are always 
considered (without much more motivation than reflecting the four causes distinguished 
by Aristotle: see Moravcsik, 1975). Although this is an issue that would take us too far, 
it is probably sensible to assign different kinds of knowledge structures/concepts to 
different classes of entities. Like in the original qualia structures, the aspects to be taken 
into consideration are the aspects or features that characterize a certain kind. However, 
                                                          
11 Again, it is interesting to compare the approach to Loebner’s study case of writing. The high-level 
action of writing (as when one writes movingly) requires realizers. The typical realizer of that action used 
to be moving a pen in certain ways on a sheet of paper. Perhaps that is still the prototypical realizer of 
writing-high-level, even though it is now more usual to realize that action by typing.  
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not all kinds of entities are characterisable in the same way. In the kinds that concern us 
now, characteristic features include features that typically realize, make actual or 
implement the kind (plus: they are typically available for being the objects of 
predication). This holds for institutions and their different ways of being part of the 
world (as social organizations, as part of society, as physical entities, etc.), as well as for 
countries, informational contents, drinkables, and so on. Drinkables, for instance, 
require containers to be “actualized” as such drinkables: this is the reason why it would 
make sense to include a “container” aspect in the knowledge structure corresponding to 
‘beer’, for instance. Informational contents, in turn, require physical realizations, which 
explains that reference to a physical object will be in the knowledge structure associated 
to ‘book’, ‘letter’, etc. In sum: it seems that more features than the four Aristotelian 
causes are relevant (i) to characterize a kind, and (ii) to account for predication. Some of 
these features or aspects relate to ways of making certain (typically abstract) kinds real. 
Thus, the proposal in (7) is not simply an after-the-fact structure that accounts for the 
different senses the word school. However, a structure like this does account for the 
typical senses of school, namely: 
 (8)  The school [building] is on fire. 
 (9) She went to school [process]. 
(10) School [timetable] starts at 9:00.  
(11) The school [rules] has prohibited wearing hats in the classroom.  
(12) I have talked to the school [director, staff] about it already. 
(13) Today the school [participants] went for a visit to the Cathedral.  
(14) The school [sport team representation] has won the championship again. 
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A structure like this locates all these different aspects in a single representation. How 
are these different aspects of a knowledge structure/concept turned into senses of a 
polysemous expression? The response depends on the general answer we give to why 
polysemy is so widespread. A fair bet is that polysemy (using the same word to mean 
different but related things) makes communication and learnability easier and more 
efficient (Falkum 2011; 2015; Xu et al. 2017). Polysemy is a way to comply with the 
maxim of Relevance that guides communicative exchanges in general: a way to 
maximize cognitive effects while minimizing processing cost (Falkum 2011). Applying 
this general view to the polysemy of school, we can say that communicative exchanges 
about the building where students go, the process they engage in, etc., are facilitated by 
the use of the same word, school. These different contents are already part of a coherent 
knowledge structure, which means that they are easily accessible to both speaker and 
hearer. The use reinforces the coherence of the structure and the accessibility of the 
different senses, but it is reasonable to think that the meanings are easily accessible 
from the start. We can say, thus, that the information structure provides different 
possibilities for denotation for the word school, and that speakers and hearers are aware 
of this. 
The consensus in psycholinguistics seems to be that the polysemous senses of a word 
are stored in one single lexical entry. At least, the thesis seems to hold for closely 
related senses, given that closely related senses co-activate each other instead of 
competing for activation. This co-activation, on the other hand, may last for 750 ms. or 
more (McGregor et al. 2015). Now, the senses of a polysemous expression such as 
school are particularly closely related . There may be some dispute about the extent to 
which the ‘one representation’ thesis applies to all kinds of polysemous words, but it 
surely applies to school and similar cases. The next step is tentative, but seems to have 
21 
 
some empirical support: whereas many different polysemy patterns show sense co-
activation, the more related the aspects are, the stronger the co-activation pattern they 
form (see Schumacher, 2013, forth.). That is, if two, or three, or n senses are very 
closely related, it will be usually the case that the activation of one of them results in a 
high and enduring activation of the others.  
In what follows, I will try to explain why senses that belong to structures like (7) may 
form especially coherent activation packages. The idea will be that these senses are 
more closely related than any other set of senses because we picture the entities that 
they denote very closely related by means of realization or actualization relations. 
 
Co-predication 
The notion of activation packages is the starting point for an account of co-predication 
patterns. Co-predication occurs when the same polysemous nominal expression has 
simultaneous predications selecting for two different meanings or senses. Consider: 
(15) The school that caught fire was celebrating 4th of July when the fire started.  
(16) Brazil is a large Portuguese-speaking republic that is very high in inequality 
rankings but always first in the FIFA ranking. 
(17) The city has 500,000 inhabitants and outlawed smoking in bars last year 
(Asher 2011) 
(18) The best university of the country has caught fire. 
Co-predication generates some puzzles that must be solved, apart from the puzzle that it 
generates to the truth-conditional semantics enterprise. Here I want to focus on two 
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issues, also relevant to the issue about truth-conditions: (i) why there are some senses 
that co-predicate and others that do not, and (ii) how we interpret co-predicative 
sentences.  
 Let’s take (15): when the reader reads (15), the word school activates the whole 
informational structure (7), and, with it, all the different aspects. The predicate caught 
fire selects the building aspect of school. However, this does not mean that the other 
senses decay –that is, they do not get deactivated-. They are all still active when the 
reader encounters the next predicate: was celebrating 4th of July. Thus, she finds no 
problem in selecting another sense that would comply with the selectional preferences 
of the predicate, namely, the sense “participants”, which targets teachers and students. 
There is, in principle, no difference between co-predication and anaphoric binding: in 
both cases what is required is that the reader or hearer can select the sense that she 
needs in order to comply with the selectional preferences of the surrounding linguistic 
material. The initial answer to the question (i): what makes co-predication easy for some 
polysemes and not for others, is that co-predication will be easy and natural if the senses 
form an activation package, which, in turn, will occur when the senses are particularly 
closely related (as in the case of school). In polysemies that do not allow for co-
predication (e.g., ‘the ham sandwich is impatient [sense: person] and cold [sense: 
sandwich]’), we see that the activation of one sense involves the de-activation of the 
other, and so that they do not form a package (see Schumacher, 2013 for the 
experimental evidence). More controversially, the same seems to happen with the 
marginally good ‘Tim drank the bottle [content] and broke it [container]’. In such cases, 
where we see some inhibitory effects, we also observe that the entities that the senses 
denote are not related by realization relations (e.g., a bottle (container) is not made 
actual by a content). 
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This proposal has some similarities with what Arapinis (2013) and Arapinis and Vieu 
(2015) propose, except that they want to argue for the existence of complex entities. 
Arapinis and Vieu (2015) take a mereological approach towards dot objects and address 
the question of what glues together the aspects of a dot object (e.g., school-as-institution 
and school-as-building) so that aspects can actually be considered parts or constituents 
of a complex entity. Their response, putting it briefly, is that we have dot objects when 
(a) the aspects constitute the entity; (b) the aspects are in some coincidence relation; and 
(c) the aspects are linked by some constant dependency relation that ensures and 
explains that they are typically in coincidence. The present approach to co-predication 
can be seen as a way of psychologizing Arapinis and Vieu’s ontological proposal. In the 
current view, co-predication and anaphoric binding are particularly facilitated because 
senses that denote entities that are linked by realization relations plausibly form an 
activation package. If denotations of senses are related in this way, then thinking about 
one of them makes thinking about the others easy.  This is, at the end of the day, what 
explains that these senses form activation packages: they form activation packages 
because we know that the entities they denote are related in a special way, and in such 
situations, representations forge strong association links. In a nutshell: there is a strong 
link between the different denotations that facilitates co-predication via sustained 
activation of different senses.  
Note, however, that the ultimate explanation of  what makes co-predication easy for 
some polysemes and not for others, is associationist: the activation of one sense 
activates another provided that their denotations are in a relation such that thinking 
about one facilitates thinking about the other. For this reason, typically, representations 
of denotations that are in realization relations will activate each other. Yet, there may be 
more requirements that two or more senses have to meet in order to actually persist into 
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a mutual sustained activation dynamic. For instance, it seems that the representation of 
the events (i.e. whole situations) in which the denotations participate need to fulfill 
some requirements. For instance, examples (19a-b) and (20a-b) suggest that the events 
have to be spatially or temporally coincident for co-predications to be acceptable. 
(19) ?? a. On Monday morning, the school convened to set new rules against plagiarism. 
Later that day, it was re-painted12. 
b. The school convened to set new rules while it was re-painted. 
(20) ?? a. The school caught fire when it was on excursion. 
 b. The school caught fire when it was celebrating 4th of July. 
What we see in (19a) and (20a) is that temporal or spatial displacement of the events 
involved makes interpretation difficult. Why could this be so? Phenomenologically, it 
seems that (19b) and (20b) are good because the reader can easily access a (perhaps 
imagistic)13 representation of the second event and its participants, facilitated by the 
representation of the first event and participants. In contrast, in (19a) and (20a) the 
reader experiences problems about locating the participant denoted by the intended 
sense of school in the second event. It looks like the activation of the different senses 
holds at least as long as they refer to participants in events that are temporally or 
spatially coincident or very proximal. The first event sets the spatio-temporal frame, and 
co-predication will work if the second event describes a situation easily accessible from 
that frame. Otherwise, the activation of the other senses decays14. So a possibility is that 
all the senses are activated, and so easily retrieved while an event or situation is being 
                                                          
12 Thanks to a reviewer for the example and for pressing the point. 
13 This is the account that Löhr (manuscript) is exploring. 
14 It would be good to be able to support these claims with empirical results, but, unfortunately, there is 
very little work done on co-predication. The interest that co-predication is receiving lately will hopefully 
change the situation soon. 
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described, but then sustainment or decay of the activation depends on there being strong 
association links between the representation of that event or situation and the 
representation of a second event or situation. I have to note, though, that there may be 
problems for such a view. Compare (20a), now (21a), with (21b): 
(21) ?? a. The school caught fire when it was on excursion. 
 b. The school in NYC caught fire when it was celebrating 4th of July in 
Chicago.15 
Why is (21b) better than (21a), given that the two events involved are explicitly 
spatially located in two different places? These are issues that a full account of co-
predication has to solve. In this moment, we are very far from having such an account –
we are even far from having the stock of examples that we would require to start doing 
good theorizing-. We are only beginning to scratch the surface of the phenomenon. So, 
for now, I want to restrict my commitments at this stage to the claim that all the senses 
in a structure such as the “school” structure above receive a synchronous initial 
activation and that the activation of one of the senses strongly activates the rest, forming 
thus an activation package. Then there seem to be conditions that favor suppression of 
some of these senses that are initially activated, and conditions that do not conspire 
against sustainment of the activation of all the senses. Until now, empirical research has 
been focused on studying polysemy in general in the latter kind of conditions, since the 
objective has been to research on the differences (competition vs. co-activation) 
between homonymy and polysemy. Hopefully, the interest that co-predication is 
attracting lately will foster empirical research that can help us know when and why 
sustained co-activation fails.      
                                                          
15 The example was provided by an anonymous referee of a different journal and of a different paper. 
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Denotations and truth-conditions 
In the view defended here, concepts provide different possibilities for denotation.  If a 
speaker uses the prototypical structure associated with a concept or with a part of a 
concept, the denotation of her word will differ from the denotation the word would have 
if she instead uses a theory-like structure (this is the case of water). This, of course, has 
an impact on the truth-conditions of the utterance she makes. Likewise, if she retrieves 
the physical realization part of the SCHOOL concept, the denotation of school will be a 
building, not an institution or a time in her life, or whatever.  Thus, if lexical meanings 
are concepts, lexical meanings do not have denotations, but only offer possibilities for 
denotation, i.e., a variety of possible denotations from which the speaker has to select. 
That is, the denotation potential of a word-type is not explained in terms other than the 
information stored in the meaning of such a word-type. In this view, thus, a word is 
associated with a number of denotations, and a sentence with a number of contents that 
determine different truth-conditions. Usually, the number of contents that a sentence can 
have will appear to be smaller than the number of denotational possibilities associated 
with a single word, given that much of the selection of denotations is supposed to be 
intra-linguistic: in I have talked to the school, as talk has selectional restrictions for 
animacy in both of its arguments, there are some denotations of school that are ruled 
out. 
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Is language a representational device on this approach? Remember that, according to 
some authors, the language system does not deliver contents with truth-conditions, even 
if it does deliver units that have a predicative structure, i.e., sentences. In that view, 
language cannot be considered a representational device, unlike perceptual systems, 
monkey calls or individual uses of language (Chomsky, 2016). However, according to 
the view here put forward, language should prima facie be regarded as a 
representational device: sentences do have contents that determine truth-conditions. 
Note, again, that we have only taken into account nominal expressions. What has been 
said about the lexical meaning of nouns cannot be directly transferred to verbs, 
adjectives and adverbs, much less to functional words16. Some of these classes of words 
may have thinner meanings. But it is interesting to think that sentential meanings may 
derive from the interplay between rich meanings (of e.g., nouns) and thin meanings (of 
e.g., verbs), If something along these lines is true, then sentential meanings would 
actually determine what contents, and thus what truth-conditions, an utterance of a 
sentence may have. It is true that only individual utterances have some determinate, 
specific, truth-conditions, but, typically17, they inherit their truth-conditional content 
from the sentence-type they are tokens of: they realize or select one of the possible 
contents that the sentence provides. Alternatively, it can be said that sentence meanings 
determine disjunctive truth-conditions. They specify a definite number of situations in 
which the sentence will be true. Speakers and hearers have to select among the different 
possibilities, so there is a role that pragmatics has to play, but the role that pragmatics 
plays is that of selecting among alternatives provided by semantic knowledge. 
                                                          
16 Even some nouns can have thinner meanings. Pritchard (2018) analyzes relational nominals such as 
target and argues that they have an abstract schematic meaning. 
17 Typically, because words can also be meaningfully used in novel, ad hoc, ways (Carston, 2015). 
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Still, co-predication creates a puzzle for this kind of account. The account has it that 
word meanings are conceptual structures that offer possibilities for denotation by having 
aspects or parts that can be selected. However, what can we say about sentences such as 
(16)  Brazil is a large Portuguese-speaking republic that is very high in inequality 
rankings but always first in the FIFA ranking? 
It seems that co-predication generates a problem, since, prima facie, Brazil in sentences 
like this “intends” to stand for many parts of the concept simultaneously. An option that 
I think should be taken seriously is to hold that co-predicational structures are 
shorthands of more complicated structures. Thus, (16) can be taken to be shorthand of:  
(16a) Brazil [place] is a large piece of land & Brazil [people] is Portuguese-speaking & 
Brazil [State] is a republic & Brazil [economic system] is very high in inequality & 
Brazil [football team] is always first in the FIFA rankings. 
Actually, this explicitation of truth-conditions is the best option for anybody who wants 
to hold at least that linguistic utterances have representational contents. As mentioned 
above, co-predication is not a specific problem for defenders of truth-conditional 
semantics. It is also a problem for those who, like Pietroski (2005, 2018), following 
Strawson (1950), want to maintain that only individual speakers refer, i.e. that reference 
is an individual’s act. In this case, we can say either that an individual using (16) fails to 
refer or that she is ultimately expressing something like the paraphrase (16a) by some 
sort of previous compilation of the different senses. That is, a speaker seems to intend to 
refer to many of the different aspects that form the BRAZIL concept, since she predicates 
properties that correspond to those different aspects or parts of the concept. However, 
the way she refers to those different parts is by using a single, compilatory, term that 
binds (in the psychological sense) them all. At the hearer’s end, the singular tem Brazil 
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activates the package formed by all the different senses or parts of the concept. Thus, it 
is easy for her to establish a correspondence between the predicates and the entities such 
predicates ascribe properties to: senses are there, active, for her to retrieve them as she 
goes on processing the sentence. But then note that this kind of response is also 
available to someone who wants to hold that word-type meanings provide possibilities 
for denotation and that speakers select among them. 
Providing the truth-conditions of a co-predicative (or anaphoric) structure in this way 
may be a non-trivial matter. I assume some examples will be more complicated than 
others. The sentence above (16), is structurally simple, and can be “paraphrased” by the 
procedure of stacking conjunctions. Initially, it may seem more difficult to provide 
paraphrases for: 
(22) There is no school painted in red that is good enough. 
However, one possible explicitation of the truth-conditions of (23) is:  
(22a) there is no school [building] that is painted in red such that that school 
[institution] is good enough.  
The problem, of course, is how it can be that that school in the final clause refers to an 
institution, given that apparently it has to make reference to a building. But this is 
possible: the hearer or reader of (22) can easily retrieve the sense “institution”. The 
relative clause in (22) does not have the effect of determining that the reference of the 
subject of the clause is a building, precisely because school offers different possibilities 
for denotation, all of which are active at the moment of interpreting the relative clause. 
This means that when the speaker has to find a meaning for school in the relative clause 
she can select the institution sense, give school the semantic value: [that institution: 
institution located in building painted in red], and thus get the truth-conditions in (22a). 
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Actually, assigning these truth-conditions to (22) is no more problematic than assigning 
its corresponding truth-conditions to a sentence like: 
(23) I talked to the hospital but they told me that I have to wait still another week. 
In (23) the reader accesses the sense “staff” and consequently uses the plural pronoun 
they to refer to the staff in the second clause. The sense of hospital is the same in both 
clauses. However, research on this kind of polysemy has shown that switching from one 
sense to another of a polysemous expression is only a bit more costly than repeating 
senses (Frisson, 2015), which means that assigning truth-conditions (22a) to (22) should 
not be more complicated that assigning its corresponding truth-conditions to (23).  
I am aware that this way of explaining the truth-conditions of co-predicative sentences 
may clash with some well-established ideas and practices in linguistics and philosophy 
of language. For instance, the proposal has to reject the ideas that each NP/DP should 
have just one denotation and that sentences that are syntactically alike have to be 
semantically alike as well. The proposal has to reject also that any sentence of the kind 
‘a is F’ entails an existential ‘there is an x that is F’. From ‘the school round the corner 
is big but not what we like for our kids’, it does not follow that there is a something that 
is round the corner, big, and not what we like for our kids’. It is therefore 
understandable that semanticists have not taken the turn that I commend here. Yet, my 
concern here has been with whether the truth-conditions of co-predicative sentences can 
be said to depend on semantic knowledge. Following Pietroski (Pietroski et al., 2009), it 
is possible to link truth-conditions with “verification procedures”: the truth-conditions 
of a given expression are linked to the way we actually try to verify whether the 
sentence is true or not. In the case of co-predicative sentences, it seems reasonable that 
we verify whether they are true by picking apart the different senses and pairing them to 
31 
 
their respective predicates. The claim then is that to do this we do use semantic 
knowledge, i.e., that the verification procedure that we use to assign truth-conditions to 
co-predicative sentences resorts to our lexico-conceptual knowledge associated with 
nouns that co-predicate.  
Closing Remarks 
Chomsky (2016) (see also, Berwick and Chomsky, 2016) holds that there are two 
mysteries associated to language: one is how recursion appeared, and the other is where 
the atoms of meaning, the units that recursion operates on, came from. His view is that, 
whereas animal signs are referential, the basic units of human languages are mind-
dependent, perspectival, concepts. Thus, he insists that the semantic properties of 
human language cannot have evolved from animal signing –or from any other animal 
cognitive capacities-. One of his major arguments is based on copredication, since 
copredicative sentences have NPs that cannot be said to refer to anything in the world. 
Followers of Chomsky such as Pietroski, Glanzberg (2014) or Yalcin (2014) interpret 
the import of the phenomenon somewhat differently. In their view, co-predication and 
variability show that meanings have to be underdetermined, to the point that they could 
be mere indexes to concepts.  
In the view presented here, the semantic properties of language could draw from our 
conceptual structures. Perhaps there is nothing like these conceptual structures in 
animals, though there is plausibly some continuity between animals’ concepts and 
human concepts (bodies of knowledge stored in long-term memory). However, this does 
not imply that our language is not referential, that the meanings of the words of our 
language are mysterious in any sense, or that they are underdetermined, schematic, or 
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indexical in nature18. The way in which signs connect with references is more 
complicated than customarily assumed, but still, language can be said to be 
representational. A lexical meaning, that is, the meaning associated with a word-type is 
a concept that offers different possibilities for denotation. The meaning of a sentence 
depends on the possibilities for denotation offered by words, the selectional preferences 
of such words, and the proper structure of the sentence. In some cases, it may look like 
certain word-tokens cannot have a denotation: instead of selecting one of the 
possibilities offered by the lexical meaning of the word-type, the speaker seems to be 
intending to refer to several of these denotations at the same time. However, the world 
does not contain entities that can be formed by an operation that takes as input such 
denotations. In these cases, speakers form a compilation of senses with different 
denotations, a compilation that is made possible by an especially high degree of co-
activation, but refer to each of the denotations that form part of the compilation. That is, 
senses are compiled, though referential intentions relate to each of the different senses 
in the compilation. 
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with her has shaped up my views significantly. 
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